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Flaherty v. Weinberg: ATTORNEY
NON CLIENT LIABILITY
In Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md.
116, 492 A.2d 618 (1985) the Court of
Appeals of Maryland was faced with the
question of whether an attorney may be
liable to a nonclient resulting from professional malpractice. After a discussion
of the treatment of the issue by other jurisdictions and an examination of prior
Maryland court decisions, the court held
that an attorney may indeed be liable to a
nonclient for professional malpractice,
but only under certain circumstances.
The Flahertys contracted to purchase
property in Frederick County, Maryland
and secured a mortgage loan from First
Federal. Weinberg was retained by First
Federal to represent it at settlement, although the Flahertys did not retain counsel. At settlement, the Flahertys were
assured by Weinberg, relying upon the
Ford land survey, that the boundaries of
the property were the same as described
in the sales contract. Several years after
settlement, and after several improvements had already been made to the property, the Flahertys had another survey
done. This survey revealed that the prior
Ford survey had misstated the property's
boundaries by eight feet. Upon learning
of this discrepancy, the Flahertys questioned Weinberg concerning the existence
of any other land surveys. Weinberg provided the Flahertys with the Fox land
survey, which had been ordered by First
Federal and was completed several weeks
after settlement. The Fox survey revealed
that the Ford survey was erroneous and
that there was indeed an encroachment of
eight feet by the Flahertys onto their
neighbor's property.
The Flahertys filed a declaration, which
was later amended, in the Circuit Court
for Frederick County against Weinberg
asserting three causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) breach of warranties; and
(3) negligent misrepresentation. The trial
court sustained Weinberg's demurrers to
all three causes of action and it is from
these rulings that this case reached the
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
The Flaherty court began by exploring
the historical background of this issue, including its treatment by courts in other
jurisdictions. The United States Supreme
Court, in National Savings Bank v. Ward,
100 U.S. 195 (1880), held that an attorney is not liable to a third party for
professional malpractice in the absense of
fraud, collusion, or privity of contract.
The opinion is based on two major concerns: "(1) that to allow such liability would
deprive the parties to the contract of their
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own agreement; and (2) that a duty to the
general public would impose a huge potential burden of liability on the contracting
parties." Need.ham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d
1060, lO61, (D.C. App. 1983) (quoting
Guy v. Liederbach, 279 Pa. Super. 543,
547, 421 A.2d 333, 335 (1980), affd in
part 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983).
The traditional rule requiring strict
privity of contract in attorney malpractice
cases has been relaxed in many jurisdictions. There are several theories upon
which this relaxation has been based, including: (1) third party beneficiary; (2) balancing of factors; (3) assumption of duty;
and (4) fiduciary or agency. The third
party beneficiary theory arises when two
parties, the attorney and the client, enter
into an agreement with the intent to confer a direct benefit to a third party. This
theory has been applied in numerous
cases, especially those involving the drafting or execution of wills. The Needham
court based its decision to hold an attorney liable to a third party in an action
involving the drafting of a will for two
reasons: (1) that the rationales supporting
privity of contract do not apply in this
situation; and (2) that the purpose of
the will is to accomplish the transfer of
the testator's estate to the beneficiaries.
Needham, 459 A.2d at 1062-63.
The balancing of factors theory, as set
forth in Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685,
15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1981), requires the
court to balance a number of factors in
order to determine whether to impose a
duty on the attorney not in privity with
the third party. These factors include:
(1) extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the third party; (2) foreseeability of harm to the third party;
(3) degree of harm that the third party
suffered; (4) connection between the attorney's conduct and the injury sustained;
(5) moral blame attached to the conduct;
and (6) policy of preventing future harm.
Flaherty, 303 Md. at 124,492 A.2d at 622.
The assumption of duty theory states
that once an attorney agrees to act for the
benefit of another and he undertakes to
fulfill that promise, the attorney then has
a duty of care in fulfilling that promise.
The third party must show that the attorney undertook an action and that the
injury was a foreseeable result of the negligent performance of that action. The
fiduciary or agency theory is similar to
the assumption of duty theory, and neither
theory has been accepted in the context of
attorney malpractice cases. ld. at 123, nA,
492 A.2d at 621.
In the Flaherty decision, Judge Cole examined the development of Maryland
case law regarding attorney liability to

nonclients. This examination begins with
Wlodarek v. Thnft, 178 Md. 453, 13 A.2d
774 (1940), involving an action brought
by a successor in title against an attorney
for his erroneous opinion that the title
was good and marketable, when in fact it
was actually defective. The Maryland
Court of Appeals adopted the traditional
privity of contract rule and held that the
attorney did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs and was therefore not liable. The
court continued its adherence to the traditional privity rule in Kendall v. Rogers,
181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d 313 (1943) and
Reamer v. Kessler, 233 Md. 311, 196
A.2d 896 (1964).
Beginning in 1970 with Prescott v. Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1970),
the Maryland appellate courts have begun
to allow limited exceptions to the traditional strict privity rule in cases involving
attorney liability to nonclients. In Prescott, the court allowed a third party beneficiary to sue a court appointed receiver
for damages resulting from the improper
performance of his duties. The court's decision did not abrogate the traditional
privity rule, but merely fashioned a limited exception to that rule.
Several years later, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland decided a case
brought by the high bidders at a foreclosure sale against the attorney who conducted the sale. Clagett v. Dacy, 47 Md.
App. 23, 420 A.2d 1285 (1980). The
plaintiff's claim was that there was a duty
owed to him by the attorney. This argument was rejected by the Clagett court
which held that in order to fall within the
third party beneficiary exception to the
strict privity rule, the nonclient must be
"a person or part of a class of persons
specifically intended to be the beneficiary
of the attorney's undertaking." /d. at 29,
420 A.2d at 1289.
Most recently in Kirgan v. Parks, 60
Md. App. 1, 478 A.2d 713, cert.denied
301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 (1984), the
Maryland courts were faced with an action by a testamentary beneficiary against
the attorney who had drafted the testator's
will. The court did not allow the plaintiff's claim, but left open the possibility
under different circumstances.
After its review of Maryland case law
the Flaherty court concluded that this
state adheres to the traditional strict privity rule in attorney malpractice cases,
with the sole exception being the third
party beneficiary theory. It is therefore
necessary for the nonclient to allege and
prove that the intent of the client to benefit the nonclient was a direct purpose of
the transaction. Flaherty, 303 Md. at 131,
492 A.2d at 625. The court went on to

alleviate fears that this exception might
be abused by pointing out that: (1) if
properly applied by the courts, this exception prohibits action by those persons
deriving an indirect benefit from the transaction; and (2) the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires an attorney to
zealously represent his clients within the
bounds of the law and to refrain from
representing clients with conflicting interests. Id. at 131, 492 A.2d at 626.
- Marc Minkove

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel: ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 105 S.Ct. 2265 (1985), the United
States Supreme Court continued to delineate the path between an attorney's
constitutional right to advertise and the
valid police power of the state in regulating the conduct oflawyers. The plurality
opinion secures the attorney's first amendment right to solicit business through
nondeceptive printed advertisements, yet
maintains the state's authority to compel
disclosure of information so that the ads
are not deceptive.
The Zauderer case involved an Ohio attorney who placed advertisements in
thirty-six newspapers within the state to
publicize his willingness to represent
women who had suffered injuries from
the use of the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine
Device. The ad featured a line-drawn illustration of the contraceptive, and included the following textual information:
The Dalkon Shield Interuterine (sic)
Device is alleged to have caused serious pelvic infections resulting in hospitalizations, tubal damage, infertility, and hysterectomies. It is also

alleged to have caused unplanned
pregnancies ending in abortions, miscarriages, septic abortions, tubal or
ectopic pregnancies, and full-term deliveries. If you or a friend have had a
similar experience do not assume it is
too late to take legal action against the
Shield's manufacturer. Our law firm
is presently representing women on
such cases. The cases are handled on
a contingent fee basis of the amount
recovered. If there is no recovery, no
legal fees are owed by the clients.
Zauderer, 105 S.Ct. at 227l.
The attorney received numerous responses
to the ads, and initiated suit for over one
hundred clients.
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel
filed a complaint against Zauderer claiming that the advertisement violated several
of the state's disciplinary rules. The Supreme Court of Ohio found that Zauderer
violated the disciplinary rules by his failure to disclose the clients potentialliability for costs, by using an illustration in
the advertisement, and because the ad
constituted an impermissible self-recommendation. The Ohio court found this
conduct warranted a public reprimand.
Zauderer filed his appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, contending that Ohio's disciplinary rules violated the first amendment by authorizing
the state to discipline him for the content
of the Dalkon Shield ad.
While most states have adopted a code
of professional responsibility which regulates the conduct of attorneys, the Supreme Court has recognized several constitutional problems with these general
rules. The Supreme Court has recognized
that an attorney has a constitutional right
to advertise, and found that state regula-

tions which provide blanket bans on advertising prices for routine legal services
violated the first amendment. Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
The Supreme Court has also found that
rules prohibiting attorneys from using
nondeceptive terminology to describe their
fields of practice were an unconstitutional
infringement on an attorney's first amendment rights. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,
(1978). Yet, the Supreme Court has allowed state regulations which prohibit inperson solicitation of clients, in certain
circumstances. Ohralik v. State Bar Assn.,
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
It is against this background that Zauderer challenged the constitutionality of
Ohio's disciplinary rules prohibiting the
solicitation of legal business through
printed advertisements containing advice
and information regarding specific legal
problems. He also challenged Ohio's restrictions on the use of illustrations, and
the state's disclosure requirements relating to contingent fees.
The Supreme Court found that while
the state could prohibit advertising that is
inherently misleading, they could not use
this reasoning to justify disciplining an attorney for running nondeceptive advertisements geared to persons with specific
legal rights. The Court noted that Zauderer's ads did not provide deceptive or
misleading information about Dalkon
Shields, and, in fact, were totally accurate. Zauderer, 105 S.Ct. at 2276-77. The
Supreme Court also noted an important
distinction between in-person solicitation
and printed advertising. While "in-person
solicitation was a practice ripe with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence,
and outright fraud," Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
464-65, printed advertising is a "means of
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